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DEVELOPING THE CONSISTENCY
DOCTRINE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS
Joseph F. DiMento*
INTRODUCTION
In a society in which quality of analysis in decisions about
the use of resources is highly valued, the potential contribu-
tion of the courts to sound environmental management is in-
creasingly discussed.' An important role for the judiciary in
land-use planning law is to fill out details that neither legisla-
tion nor administrative law adequately addresses. Adjudica-
tion leads to explication of controversies in the detail neces-
sary to fully understand their complexity. In the area of land-
use law particularly, neither the state legislature nor adminis-
trative agencies can develop the law to the operational level
necessary to resolve certain problems over the use of property.
When these land-use controversies develop into litigation, the
courts do the fine tuning of the legal doctrines and help us
elaborate and understand our system of resource
management.
One important area of land use and planning reforms
that is emerging from case law interpreting statutory man-
dates is the consistency doctrine. The doctrine states that
governments must engage in land-use planning and that their
regulatory and development controls should be based on, or
consistent with, that planning. This article analyzes the con-
O 1980 by Joseph F. DiMento.
* B.A. 1969, Harvard College; Ph.D. and J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. As-
sociate Professor of Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine. Member of the
California Bar. The author is indebted to Ms. Perri Kelly and Ms. Juanita Melgoza
for assistance in preparation of the manuscript.
1. For analyses of the potential contribution of a court system to resolution of
environmental and technical problems, see Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experi-
ment: Criticisms and Responses, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTs 43, April, 1977.
On the arguments for and against a greater role for the courts in environmental
management, see also DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Adminis-
trative Process: Empirical Findings, Remaining Issues and a Direction for Future
Research, 2 DUKE L.J. 409 (1977).
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tribution that the California courts have made to the elabora-
tion of the consistency doctrine.2
The consistency doctrine promotes a particular nexus be-
tween a land-use plan and government regulation of land use,
such as zoning and subdivision map approval. It has its roots
in the language of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,"
which states that zoning shall be done "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan."4 Under this historical antecedent of the
consistency doctrine, violations of the "in accordance with"
language were found when 1) only selected areas within a mu-
nicipality were regulated by zoning; 2) zoning was done by
means of an interim ordinance that was passed by legally
questionable government procedures; or 3) the zoning ordi-
nance failed to control one or more of the factors that it was
intended to regulate, for example, uses or heights. The consis-
tency doctrine, however, ushers in a new relationship between
planning and zoning (as well as between planning and other
land-use controls). It is by and large the creature of recent
legislation, and it places much greater importance on the gen-
eral plan and the planning process. The initial requirement in
a jurisdiction following the doctrine is that the local govern-
ment develop a general, master, or comprehensive plan. Fol-
lowing the preparation and approval of a plan, a strict consis-
tency doctrine would ordain that regulatory devices, or past or
future ordinances not in conformity with the plan, must fail.5
2. In addition to California, other states have recently made important contri-
butions to the case law on the relationship between planning and land-use controls.
Among the most active courts on the subject are Florida's. See Castellano v. Crouse,
45 F. Supp. 106 (D. Fla. 1976); Dade County v. Yumbo, 348 So. 2d 392 (1977); Dade
County Ass'n of Unincorporated Areas, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 45 Fla.
Supp. 193 (1975).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, 1922
(Rev'd ed., 1926).
4. For a summary of legislative treatment of the consistency doctrine and a
short history of the ambiguity in meaning of the "in accordance with" language, see
DiMento, Improving Development Control through Planning: The Consistency Doc-
trine, 5 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 1 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as DiMento,
Consistency].
5. The consistency doctrine has been paid considerable policy and scholarly at-
tention. See R. FISHMAN, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW (1978); N. WILLIAMS, AMERI-
CAN PLANNING LAW (1974); Brooks, The Law of Plan Implementation in the United
States, 16 URBAN L. ANN. 225 (1979); Bross, Circling the Squares of Euclidian Zon-
ing: Zoning Predestination and Planning Free Will, 6 ENVT'L L. 97 (1975); Catalano
& DiMento, Mandating Consistency Between Zoning Ordinances and General Plans:
The California Experience, 8 NAT. RESOURCES L. 455 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cat-
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The Statutory Framework
In California, the consistency requirements are found in
several sections of the Government Code.6 A common name
for the consistency laws in California is A.B. 1301, since this
was the number of the bill from which most of these statutes
were enacted in 1973. Government Code section 65300 pro-
vides that every city and county must develop a general plan.
The plan must contain the following nine elements: land use,
circulation, housing, conservation, open space, seismic safety,
noise, scenic highway, and safety. Section 65300.5 mandates
that the plan be integrated and internally consistent. Section
65566 requires that acquisition, regulation, and any other ac-
tions of the local government related to open space conform to
the local open space plan. Under section 65567, building per-
mits, subdivision maps, and zoning ordinances affecting open
space must be consistent with the open space plan. Section
65803 exempts charter cities from the consistency statutes un-
less they adopt these requirements. Section 65860 requires
county or city zoning ordinances to be consistent with the
general plan of the county or city. Section 65862 sets out the
time limitation for holding a public hearing on bringing zon-
ing into consistency with the general plan. Section 65910 re-
quires preparation and adoption of an open space ordinance
alano & DiMento, Mandating Consistency]; DiMento, Looking Back: Consistency in
Response to and Interpretation of the California Consistency Requirement: A.B.
1301, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 196 (1975); Hagman & DiMento, The Consistency Re-
quirement in California, 30 LAND USE & ZONING DIG. 6 (1978); Mandelker, The Role
of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 900(1976); Sullivan & Kressel, Twenty Years After-Renewed Significance of the Com-
prehensive Plan Requirement, 9 URB. L. ANN. 33 (1975); Tarlock, Consistency with
Adopted Land Use Plans as a Standard of Judicial Review: The Case Against, 9
URB. L. ANN. 69 (1965); Comment, Comprehensive Land Use Plans and the Consis-
tency Requirement, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 766 (1974); Comment, Urban Planning and
Land Use Regulation: The Need for Consistency, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81 (1978).
The term consistency has also been used to describe the relationship required
between federal (and certain state and local) actions in a state's coastal zone and a
state's coastal management program. See Hershman, Achieving Federal-State Coor-dination in Coastal Resources Management, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1975);
Hershman & Folkenroth, Coastal Zone Management and Inter-governmental Coor-
dination, 54 OR. L. REV. 13 (1975).
Debates over consistency center around analyses of society's planning and imple-
mentation capacity as well as on questions of social and political values. See Di-
Mento, Consistency, supra note 4, at 44-63.
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65300, 65300.5, 65566, 65567, 65803, 65860, 65862, 66473,
66474 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978).
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consistent with the local open space plan. Sections 66473 and
66474 set forth various requirements for attaining subdivision
consistency with general and specific plans. Finally, section
65860(b) provides that citizens may bring suit to enforce con-
sistency of zoning with the general plan.
The Case Law
The California appellate courts in the half decade during
which a consistency requirement has been law in California
have applied these statutes in a dozen consistency cases.
7
These decisions comprise a significant percentage of all the
recent state court analyses of the consistency doctrine
throughout the United States. California courts have ad-
dressed the definition of consistency,8 the reach of the consis-
tency requirement (what needs to be consistent with what),9
procedural aspects of compliance with the consistency re-
quirement (including the findings required at the local level
and the scope of judicial review of local determinations),10 the
effect of the consistency requirement on planning blight litiga-
tion,11 and the remedies available should inconsistencies be
found. 12 In a general sense, too, the courts throughout these
7. The single California Supreme Court case addressing consistency was Young-
blood v. Board of Supervisors, 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
Court of appeal cases reported are: San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
80 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978); Friends of "B" Street v. City of
Hayward, 75 Cal. App. 3d 148, 142 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1977); Save El Toro Ass'n v. Days,
74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977); Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City
Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Mountain Defense League v.
Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal. App. 3d 723, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1977); McMillan v.
American.Gen. Fin. Corp., 60 Cal. App 3d 175, 131 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1977); Dale v. City
of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976); Hawkins v. County
of Matin, 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1976); Woodland Hills Residents
Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council, 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 118 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1975). In addition,
a case now unpublished discussed at notes 50-55 and accompanying text infra is Si-
erra Club v. County of Alameda, 1 Civ. No. 38554 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1977) (case
was reheard and both opinions are unpublished). Another case that is unreported is
Chevy Chase Estate Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 2 Civ. No. 52161 (Cal. Ct. App. May
17, 1978). There are also some cases in which the parties did not directly argue the
consistency issue, but in which it is raised indirectly by the court. See, e.g., Jones v.
People ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 22 Cal. 3d 144, 583 P.2d 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. 640
(1978); Orsetti v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal. App. 3d 961, 146 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1978).
8. See text accompanying notes 65-71 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 16-64 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 72-98 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 118-29 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 102-13 infra.
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decisions have contributed an understanding of the status and
function of planning under a consistency doctrine. 13
This article reviews the case law under each of these cate-gories, and should provide useful background to the practi-
tioner working in the local government land-use context. In
addition, the article aims to present an example of the detail
that is required to make operational the legislature's broad-
brush statements of the consistency doctrine.
There are good reasons for tracing the California consis-
tency cases. California courts have developed an activist repu-
tation over the years in the areas of environmental and land-
use law.1 The California Supreme Court has written several
opinions that are among the most significant nationally, as in-
dicated by scholarly commentary and their use as precedent."'
Since the California courts are so influential, an analysis of
the consistency doctrine in California may give an indication
of the limits of change which the doctrine will effect in otherjurisdictions. Translation by California courts of the stark
statutory language of consistency into directives to local gov-
ernment should be instructive to other states contemplating
or initiating reforms in their land planning law. If the Califor-
nia courts limit the impact of the consistency requirements on
local government decision making, it is unlikely that other
courts in states with less activist judiciaries will read consis-
tency law in a more progressive manner.
Review in this article of existing case law suggests that
there have been no drastic changes at the local level, where
master plans are typically general in nature, easily amendable,
and limited in regulatory effect. Nonetheless, the California
courts have made a modest contribution to the enhancement
of the planning enterprise by laying the groundwork for an
analysis of the adequacy of plans and by spelling out how con-
sistency, although in a weak form, should be implemented and
how the judiciary should review local government consistency
13. See text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.
14. See DiMento et al., The California Supreme Court's Record in Land Devel-
opment and Environmental Control Law, U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming).
15. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. City of Los Ange-
les, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954); Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95,
222 P.2d 439 (1950); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Miller v.
Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 281 (1925); Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal.
416, 132 P. 584 (1913), afl'd, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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determinations.
THE CALIFORNIA CONSISTENCY DECISIONS
The Initial Determination: What Needs to Be Consistent
with What?
The California legislative scheme is silent on several nar-
row but important initial local government consistency con-
siderations. These are: 1) What is the applicable plan for con-
sistency analysis when a general plan is replaced or amended?
2) What are the implications for considerations of consistency
if a general plan is incomplete? 3) Must applications for con-
ditional use permits be evaluated for consistency with general
plans? 4) Are private development plans to be subjected to
consistency analysis? The courts, however, have been con-
fronted with these issues. What follows is an analysis of the
relevant supreme court and appellate opinions.
The applicable general plan. The California Supreme
Court in Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors" addressed the
question of which general plan must be analyzed for consis-
tency when a final subdivision map approval is challenged and
the municipality has altered its plan since the tentative map
was approved.
The case arose when neighbors of a subdivision filed suit
against the Board of Supervisors of San Diego County alleging
that the Board had abused its discretion in approving a final
subdivision map that did not conform to the existing general
plan. The case was complicated by the fact that consistency
law was entangled with seemingly incompatible California
code provisions relating to approval of a final subdivision map
once a tentative map has been approved. When the developer
in Youngblood had submitted his tentative map, the general
plan of the county provided for densities of .75 dwelling units
per acre. In conformity with this plan, the developer planned
buildings of approximately .6 units per acre, and his tentative
map was approved. The county later adopted a community
plan for the subdivision area which called for a "rural estate"
use of the land. Under this designation, the county allowed
only one dwelling unit on each two-acre parcel.
When the developer met all the conditions imposed upon
16. 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
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the tentative map, the county proceeded to approve the final
subdivision map despite the fact that it was not in conformity
with the amended plan. The stage was thus set for allegations
of a conflict between the state's Subdivision Map Act,17 which
makes ministerial the approval of a final subdivision map if
conditions imposed upon approval of a tentative map are sub-
stantially met, and the consistency requirement that subdivi-
sion maps conform to the applicable general plan.
The California Supreme Court concluded that the "appli-
cable" plan for consistency consideration means "the general
plan in effect when the tentative map was approved. '" 8 The
court based its decision on application of the state Senate's
amendment to the subdivision consistency requirement of
A.B. 1301, which resolved any conflict between the statutes.
When finally passed, this section stated:
A governing body shall not deny approval of a final sub-
division map pursuant to Section 11549.5 [of the Califor-
nia Business and Professions Code] if it has previously
approved a tentative map for the proposed subdivison
and if it finds that the final map is in substantial compli-
ance with the previously approved tentative map.'9
The court rejected the narrow interpretation of the
amendment argued by plaintiffs: that the new section does
not limit the governing body's power to deny approval on the
basis of an inconsistency with a general plan.2 0 The court read
the legislative intent of A.B. 1301 and its amendments to be
"that a final map should not be disapproved for failure to
comply with requirements, including general plans, inapplica-
ble at the time of approval of the tentative map. '21
The court's statutory interpretation was clearly com-
pelled by the language of the code. Furthermore, fairness re-
quires this result even absent specific clarifying legislation. As
17. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.37 (West Supp. 1978).
18. 22 Cal. 3d at 656, 586 P.2d at 563, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
19. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11549.6 (West 1966). This section was repealed
March 1, 1975, but it governed subdivisions for which the tentative map was ap-
proved prior to March 1, 1975. The section that replaced it states substantially the
same proposition-that a final map shall be disapproved only for failure to meet orperform requirements or conditions that were applicable to the subdivision at the
time of approval of the tentative map. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66473 (West Supp. Pamph.
1966-1978).
20. 22 Cal. 3d at 656, 586 P.2d at 563, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
21. Id. at 656 n.11, 586 P.2d at 563 n.11, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.11.
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the court noted, approval of a tentative map is often followed
by expenditures by a developer to meet the conditions im-
posed.22 These conditions may alter the land in ways that
make it inconsistent with alternative uses. "[Ilt is only fair,"
opined the court, to meet the developer's reliance on approval
of a final map." Another positive effect of the court's opinion
is that it encourages local government to streamline its ap-
proval process and discourages development opponents from
engaging in spot planning in order to block the subdivision
after initial approval. While it may be true that the commu-
nity's interests are only made obvious upon a specific action,
such as approval of a tentative map, reforms to insure ade-
quate consideration of those interests should not be made at
the expense of a party who has acted in reliance upon the ex-
isting process.
The inadequate general plan. Another issue addressed by
the California courts with respect to the initial determination
under the consistency doctrine is whether it is possible to
make a finding of consistency with a plan when there is no
such plan. Historically, courts have not required the existence
of a separate planning document or process to meet the "in
accordance with" requirement. Courts have also refused to in-
vestigate whether an entity offered as a plan is complete or
adequate.
Obviously, to the strong consistency advocate there can
be no consistency of a land-use device with a nonexistent
plan.24 The implications of this conclusion, however, may
vary. First, if this notion is not linked with a set of effective
remedies, such as an injunction forbidding a county or city
from approving development until a plan is made, the ruling
is impotent. 5 Second, the conclusion that there must first be
an adequate plan is compromised according to the extent the
reviewing courts will accept incomplete plans.
In the California case addressing the inadequate plan is-
sue, Save El Toro Association v. Days,2 the appellate court
was unwilling to make any such compromises. The court of
22. Id. at 655, 586 P.2d at 562, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
23. Id.
24. Nonetheless, there may be instances where such a position is not followed.
See DiMento, Consistency, supra note 4, at 56.
25. See the discussion of remedies in text accompanying notes 101-13 infra.
26. 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977).
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appeal found simply that a partial plan would not suffice to
meet California's general plan requirement. Save El Toro in-
volved a challenge by a citizens' group to the approval of a
district improvement project and associated activities. The
plaintiffs complained that the actions would restrict use of
open space land. When such a challenge is made, it triggers
the application of the consistency statute governing use of
open space, Government Code section 65567, which provides
that a local government body may not approve building per-
mits or subdivision maps unless the proposed action is consis-
tent with a local space plan.2 The open space plan can either
be adopted separately or as an element of the city's or
county's general plan. In the Save El Toro situation, the city
of Morgan Hill had no open space plan, however, and plain-
tiffs alleged that the various ordinances offered by the defen-
dant city as evidence of a general plan were not the equivalent
of such a plan. The material offered by the city as its plan was
missing five of the nine general plan elements required by
California law.2 8 Nor had the city undertaken, as required by
the Open Space Lands Act,"0 the inventory of open space re-
sources, which is a prerequisite to adoption of an open space
plan.30
The court in Save El Toro ruled in favor of the challeng-
ers, concluding that "obviously," in order for a consistency de-
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65567 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978). The section
provides:
No building permit may be issued, no subdivision map approved, and no
open-space zoning ordinance adopted, unless the proposed construction,
sub-division or ordinance is consistent with the local open space plan.
28. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978). The section re-
quires cities and counties to adopt, as parts of the plan, the following elements: land
use, circulation, housing, conservation, open space, seismic safety, noise, scenic high-
way and safety. See text accompanying note 6, supra.
29. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 65560-65570 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978). That actis one of California's most strongly pro-environmental statutes. It requires that a lo-
cal government inventory its open space resources. These are broadly defined as par-
cels of land and resources that are essentially unimproved (Id. § 65560(b)) and de-
voted to any of several open space uses-from management for the production of
resources (Id. § 65560(b) (2)) to provision of scenic outdoor areas (Id. § 65560(b)(3)).
Once the area is inventoried, the local government must act to preserve open space(Id. § 65561(a)) and prevent its premature and unnecessary conversion to urban uses(Id. § 65561(b)). This is to be done by preparation of a "local open space plan for the
comprehensive and long-range preservation of open space land." (Id. § 65563).
30. Id. § 65563(b).
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termination to be made "there must first be such a plan."'" As
for a remedy, the reviewing court of appeal was equally ex-
plicit and succinct: "As the City of Morgan Hill has not
adopted a valid open space plan, the city cannot take any ac-
tion to acquire, regulate or restrict open space land or approve
a subdivision map.
3 2
There are several implications of the Save El Toro deci-
sion. One is that the opinion provides a strong incentive for a
local entity to engage in planning. Even a local government
with a no-growth policy should feel the impact of Save El
Toro, for not only is development precluded prior to plan
adoption, but regulation of open space is similarly prohibited.
It would be a rare community that would promote open space
preservation through the total absence of regulation and
management.
Because open space law is especially strict in California,
one cannot generalize from the court's conclusion in Save El
Toro, however, that where a plan is missing an element there
can be no consistency, to a rule that the California courts will
take such a strong pro-planning posture in cases involving
other missing elements.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from dicta in Save
El Toro is that variation in the form of a city's or county's
plan is acceptable. The general plan, for example, need not be
adopted as a single ordinance,13 although the California legis-
lative intent is that there be internal consistency among the
parts of a plan.3 4 Nonetheless, the range of tolerance does not
include the city's post hoc attempts to gather up "a number
of ordinances," as in Save El Toro, and claim that these com-
prise a general plan.3 In this case, Morgan Hill's scheme of
regulation was missing the required conservation, seismic
safety, noise, scenic highway and safety elements. In addition,
the city was not in compliance with the law for failure to carry
out the required inventory of open space resources. The opin-
ion thus reinforces California's legislative requirement that
plans precede regulation and stands for the proposition that a
separate recognizable planning product must be adopted
31. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 70-71, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
32. Id. at 74, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
33. Id. at 72, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
34. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300.5 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
35. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
[Vol. 20
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which, although its form may vary, must contain the elements
required by statute. It must be "an integrated . . . statement
of policies for the adopting agency." 6 In addition, plans must
be based on knowledge of resources and must meet such legis-
latively imposed goals as "discouraging premature and unnec-
essary conversion of open-space land to urban uses. '3 7
The conditional use permit. Must conditional uses be
evaluated for consistency with the general plan? Two Califor-
nia court of appeal decisions have answered emphatically in
the negative, describing that evaluation as unnecessary and
undesirable.38 Their reasoning is that adequate guidelines for
issuance of conditional use permits are provided in California
law and that to require consistencywould remove flexibility in
zoning administration.
A conditional use permit is a privilege granted by a local
governing body to a party to use land in a manner that con-
forms to a special list of exceptions written into the local zon-
ing code. For example, a conditional use ordinance might per-
mit philanthropic or educational institutions to be located in
residential districts. It is within the discretion of the zoning
administrator to issue these special permits upon a finding
that the use meets the "general welfare" test. Under that test,
the use is permitted if it will not be detrimental to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, convenience, or welfare of the people
living in the neighborhood or to the property or improvements
of the area. 9  I
In the first case, Hawkins v. County of Marin4 0 a reli-
gious social service group sponsored a plan for constructing
federally subsidized multi-unit housing for the elderly on land
owned by an affiliate of the Roman Catholic Church in an
area zoned for single-family residences. After an unsuccessful
first attempt, the group secured a conditional use permit.4 1
Two years after the permit was issued, land-owner neighbors
36. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 63500.5 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
37. Id. § 65561.
38. Hawkins v. County of Marin, 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1976);
Sierra Club v. County of Alameda, 1 Civ. No. 38554 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1977)(case was reheard and both opinions are unpublished).
39. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
40. 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1976).
41. Subsequent to the first attempt, the county amended its zoning ordinance
to include housing for low and moderate income persons among the land uses for
which a conditional use permit could be granted.
1980] 295
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of the proposed housing development brought suit against the
county, contending that the project was impermissible under
the property's zoning and if not thus impermissible, then the
county's zoning regulations were inconsistent with its general
plan. The thrust of the argument was that conditional use
permits, as well as zoning ordinances, must be consistent with
county general plans.
The court was readily able to dispose of this consistency
count by reference to Government Code section 6586042 and
related consistency statutes. The court reasoned,
Since use permits issued pursuant to Matin County Code
... must necessarily conform to its requirements, it fol-
lows that if the code section is kept consistent with the
general plan, use permits issued thereunder will also be
consistent therewith. There is no requirement . .. that
such permits themselves be reviewed for consistency with
the plan under Section 65860.48
The court noted further that the consistency requirement ap-
plies to zoning ordinances,4 4 subdivision maps,4 5 and to a de-
gree, projects needing a building permit 6 and that "the fail-
ure of Section 65860 to create a parallel requirement for
conditional use permits is significant. '47 This omission from
the code was sufficient for the court to affirm the summary
judgment of the lower court, precluding a consistency review
of the conditional use permit.
48
The second case, Sierra Club v. County of Alameda,49
also upheld a local government's decision to grant a condi-
tional use permit. The case has been reheard by the court of
appeal and the opinion is no longer published. Nonetheless, it
is some evidence of the California judiciary's thinking on the
length of the consistency chain and on the extent to which a
plan will be read to restrict local government discretion.
The court in Sierra Club offered a "flexibility" rationale
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
43. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
44. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
45. Id. §§ 66473.5-66474.
46. Id. § 65567.
47. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 595, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61.
48. The court concluded that the general welfare standard was a sufficient guide
to the administrator to grant a conditional use permit.
49. 1 Civ. No. 38554 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1977). Since the case went unpub-
lished, quotations extracted from the opinion are not cited to any particular page.
[Vol. 20
CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE
for not subjecting a conditional use permit application to
strict consistency scrutiny. The court said that justification
for conditional use permits "lies in the growing need for flex-
ibility in zoning administration, and the avoidance of detailed
standards worked out in advance .... ",50 "Flexibility" in this
case meant allowing, within an agricultural district, a
development
consisting of 18 tennis courts, 40 riding horses with sta-
bles, corral and trails, a youth camp with shelter build-
ings including bunkhouses, toilets and cooking and eating
accommodations, a health spa with outdoor sulphur and
"health" springs and lagoon and pools, swimming and
wading pools, and related water supply, sewage, fire fight-
ing, and other facilities . . . "guest villas" and additional
accommodations for . . . employees.'
The majority felt that the "general welfare" test pro-
tected the public adequately and that it was important to give
great weight to the local legislative body's reading of its own
law. A dissent in Sierra Club, however, nicely frames another
important issue of consistency assessment where a conditional
use permit is involved. The dissenting judge worried that fail-
ure to evaluate closely the relationship of a proposed use to
the use specified explicitly in the relevant zoning ordinance
"would effectively result in amendment of that ordinance in
the guise of a conditional use."' 52 The dissent rejected the ma-jority's conclusion that conditional uses allowed by a county
ordinance are illustrative, not exclusive, and saw danger in al-
lowing discretion in administrative interpretation of terms
used in the ordinance. Such discretionary decisions, the judge
concluded, could result in a "rezoning of a district" without
formal amendment of the zoning ordinance.2
If other courts were to follow the reasoning in the Sierra
Club opinion, the restrictive effect of local plans would be
minimal. The opinion sanctions issuing permits for uses that
are nowhere described in the list of conditional uses appended
to the local zoning ordinance. If other California courts decide
to rely on a general welfare test, they will transfer the touch-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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stone of consistency evaluation from a written statement that
is accessible to all (i.e., "detailed standards worked out in ad-
vance")54 to the discretion of elected officials. The general
welfare test is incompatible with a consistency standard un-
less a very trivial definition of consistency is accepted. If the
courts allow the consistency doctrine to sink to a mere evalua-
tion of the conformity of a proposed project with a govern-
ment official's understanding of what is best for the commu-
nity, illuminated, but not compelled, by that community's
land-use plans and ordinances, they will reject the very foun-
dation upon which reform in land-use planning is built-the
desire to limit discretion in the process of controlling
development.
55
The private development plan. Another aspect of the is-
sue of the reach of consistency arose in Mountain Defense
League v. Board of Supervisors.6 In this case, the court of
appeal addressed the problem of whether a private develop-
ment plan (PDP), submitted for approval by a developer,
must be evaluated for consistency with a general plan. The
opinion indicated, without holding explicitly, that since ap-
proval of a PDP was only one of several approvals that a de-
veloper must obtain before he begins construction, a consis-
tency determination about the plan itself is not required. The
court equated the PDP with a "specific plan." It concluded
that, unlike a zoning change or subdivision map, a specific
plan does not have to be consistent with the general plan.' In
Mountain Defense League, the court approved the local gov-
ernment's approving the PDP and then amending the general
plan to effect consistency.
The decision is peculiar and may have little lasting prece-
dential value. The court vaguely indicated that the consis-
tency requirement did not apply anyway, because "A.B. 1301
did not take effect until after the [trial court's] decision in
this case."' 8 Thus, it is unclear whether the court would come
to the same conclusion if a similar case came up today. For
several reasons, a different outcome is predictable. First, the
specific plan in California is becoming increasingly used as a
54. Id.
55. See DiMento, Consistency, supra note 4.
56. 65 Cal. App. 3d 723, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1977).
57. Id. at 733, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
58. Id.
[Vol. 20
CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE
planning tool. 9 While there is confusion as to the exact na-
ture of a specific plan and its legal significance, developers
and local governments appear to favor its use. Generally, a
specific plan applies to an area smaller than that covered by
the general plan. It contains all relevant "regulations, condi-
tions, programs and proposed legislation" necessary for or
useful to implementation of the general plan. 0 Second, al-
though submission of a private development plan is an "early
step" in the process of gaining governmental approval for de-
velopment, there is a strong movement toward simplifying
governmental processing of requests for permission to build.
It makes little sense to avoid the question of consistency when
the developer first applies for governmental approval if a de-
termination will be made soon thereafter. Finally, the opinion
not only declared that the consistency requirement was inap-
plicable, but it rejected a requirement of evaluation of the
PDP's impact on internal consistency of the general plan. The
court found "consistency with the balance of the document"
(the general plan) at the time the PDP was approved to be
"merely advisory and in no way mandatory." 61 The court
treated internal consistency simply as a recommendation by
the Council on Intergovernmental Relations. Today internal
consistency is a statutory requirement in California. Section
65300.5 of the Government Code states, "The Legislature in-
tends that the general plan and elements and parts thereof
comprise an integrated, internally consistent and compatible
statement of policies for the adopting agency."62
An Early Determination: What Does Consistency Mean?
The impact of the consistency requirement will depend to
a significant degree on the legal definition of "consistency"
adopted. Tests can vary from one that assesses whether a pro-
posal fits in general with the objectives of a plan to one which
requires that a project's densities, lot sizes, setbacks, height
59. The real estate industry has turned its attention to use of the specific plan
as a means of integrating, early in the process of governmental consideration, varying
perspectives on land use. See Kinchen, Specific Plan Is Land Use Tool: Developers,
Communities Like the Approach, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 14, 1979, pt. VIII, at 33,
cols. 1-5.
60. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65450.1, 65451-65452 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
61. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
62. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300.5 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
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restrictions, and other features are in accord with a highly de-
tailed comprehensive and long-range plan. The California Su-
preme Court and an appellate court have added their opinions
to the controversy over an acceptable definition in the Califor-
nia context of a fairly detailed general plan, but there has
been no authoritative holding enunciating a single test.
The California Supreme Court in Youngblood v. Board of
Supervisors,63 hinted that it might in the future adopt a very
strict stance in defining the planning-regulation nexus. In that
case, the court found that .6 dwelling units per acre in the
tentative subdivision map at issue was not in conflict with a
plan that allowed densities from 0 to .75 dwelling units per
acre and directed that the densities be greater near the coast.
Nonetheless, having no need to address the question of consis-
tency with the new general plan promulgated in that case, the
court left open the question of whether a subdivision provid-
ing for a specified density would be consistent with a plan re-
quiring a minimum lot size, such as the new general plan
specified. In a footnote, the court said,
Santa Fe Company ... argues that its subdivision is con-
sistent with the new . . . plan because the subdivision
provides a density of .6 dwelling units per acre which sub-
stantially complies with the .5 dwelling units per acre
contemplated by the general plan. The general plan, how-
ever, does not speak in terms of density, but of lot size,
and appears to require a minimum size of two acres. Be-
cause we conclude that the subdivision need only comply
with the general plan in effect at the date of the approval
of the tentative map; we need not resolve whether it also
complies with the new general plan. 4
One reading of the above reasoning is that the terms used
in the general plan will be applied strictly in future cases. It
might, therefore, be prudent for a community concerned with
control of overall densities to choose its planning language
carefully in terms of density, whereas if the objective were to
promote a particular life style through the determination of
lot size, then the plan should spell this out. The message of
Youngblood may be that a jurisdiction must express precisely
the objectives promoted by its general plan. For example, a
63. 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
64. Id. at 654 n.5, 586 P.2d at 561 n.5, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 247 n.5.
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very different plan would be required if the community aimed
to control traffic rather than if its goal were preservation of
open space or some other municipal aim achievable through
lot size restrictions. The plan of a community whose overall
density requirements allowed no development in certain areas
(for example, inland areas) and high-rise development in
other areas (for example, near the coast) would ultimately
look very different from one promoting homogeneous use of
large lots.
While Youngblood presents the possibility of a strict defi-
nition of consistency, it may be that a looser definition will
ultimately prevail in California if the courts go the way of the
now unpublished Sierra Club opinion. Sierra Club came the
closest of the sample of California appellate court decisions on
consistency to offering a general test for evaluating the plan-
regulation relationship known as the consistency doctrine.
The test utilized was flexible and similar to that expressed in
some of the unofficial legislative history of A.B. 1301. The
consultant to the committee considering the consistency bill
suggested that the relationship promoted was one of general
compatability between a general plan and zoning ordi-
nances."' In Sierra Club, the court concluded that the condi-
tional use permit was acceptable because it was "closely at-
tuned to the stated policy and goals of the County's Open
Space Element."6 6 That standard allowed for a finding of con-
sistency between a plan aimed at preserving open space and a
development which, from a reading of the court's statement of
the facts, was quite commercially oriented and would generate
at peak times an occupancy of about 1,300 persons on 145
acres. Furthermore, the Sierra Club view of consistency pays
considerable deference to the legislative body's interpretation
of its own ordinance. The dissent read the majority opinion as
allowing the local governing body to grant conditional use per-
mits according to its notion of the general welfare.6 7
65. See Catalano & DiMento, Mandating Consistency, supra note 5 at 459.
66. 1 Civ. No. 38554 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1977) (emphasis added).
67. As further evidence that there is pressure to allow the local legislative body
to determine its own definition of consistency, a bill introduced into the California
Legislature in 1977 would have made the local government's finding of consistency
between a general plan and a regulation a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
validity of such findings in any litigation arising out of the local government decision.
Consistency from this perspective becomes what the city or county government says
it is. DiMento, Consistency, supra note 4.
19801
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In summary, it is not yet clear what definition of consis-
tency the California courts will adopt. Consistency may vary
from a strict one-to-one relationship (i.e., if the plan speaks in
terms of densities, the regulations must closely reflect those
densities) to a general "in accordance with" test (the overall
objectives and goals of the plan must not be undermined by
the approved development). Various commentators have ar-
ticulated these choices. 8 It is time for the courts to direct at-
tention to a definition-either taking an activist position and
elaborating a test or concluding that the term is too vague to
allow reasonable judicial review and thus putting the burden
on the state legislature to offer a definition.
Scope of Review of the Local Government Consistency
Determination
Concern with findings and the substantial evidence test.
Several California cases have addressed the review function of
the courts where a consistency decision has been challenged."
These cases suggest the following rules: Local government
must make findings to support ultimate rulings on consistency
but not simply when denying a zoning change. Those findings
need not be formal. A substantial evidence test will be em-
ployed where the administrative act in question is quasi-judi-
cial-that is, where it determines specific rights under existing
law with regard to a specific fact situation. Since consistency
matters are central aspects of municipal governance, judicial
review should be limited.
The findings issue. The consistency decision that
squarely addresses the governing body's need to make find-
ings before approving a development project as to the consis-
tency of the project with the general plan is Woodland Hills
Residents Association, Inc. v. City Council.70 The citizens
group in Woodland Hills challenged, by a petition for a writ
68. See, e.g., Hagman, Public Control of California Land Development Sylla-
bus, 20TH ANNUAL SUMMER PROGRAM FOR CALIFORNIA LAWYERS, §2.29, at 22-23 (1974).
A more recent opinion by Hagman is found in Hagman & DiMento, supra note 5;
Mandelker, supra note 5; and Tarlock, supra note 5.
69. Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (1977); Mountain Defense League v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal. App. 3d
723, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1977); McMillan v. American Gen. Fin. Corp., 60 Cal. App.
3d 175, 131 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1977); Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Coun-
cil, 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 118 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1975).
70. 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 118 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1975).
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of mandamus, approvals by the local advisory agency, the
planning commission, and the city council, of a tentative sub-
division map for a residential development on a steep hill-
side.7' The Association, arguing that the project was inconsis-
tent with the new plan because its density was too great for
the steepness of the hillside, appealed from the action of the
advisory agency which had given the initial approval of the
tentative tract map. Its appeal was denied.7" A subsequent ap-
peal to the city council was also denied.73 The trial court con-
cluded that the denials by the commission and the council
constituted a finding by implication that the subdivision and
plan were consistent. The court of appeal disagreed, holding
that an "express finding that the proposed subdivision tract
map was consistent was required . .. in order to support a
decision approving the proposed map. '7 4 The court sent the
case back to the city council to make findings, stating that a
simple vote by the governing body was not the equivalent of
the findings required by the consistency statutes.75
Although the leading case on administrative findings in
local government environmental and planning matters,
Topanga Association For A Scenic Community v. County of
Los Angeles, 7 had not been decided when the suit in Wood-
land Hills came to trial, the court employed it extensively in
its Woodland Hills opinion. Topanga Association concluded
that variance boards "must render findings to support their
ultimate ruling" and that a reviewing court must determine
whether substantial evidence supports the findings of the ad-
ministrative record and whether the findings support the
board's action because granting or denying a variance is a
quasi-judicial act.7"
The Topanga Association court reasoned that findings
71. At that time, the consistency requirement was found in CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 11526(c), 11526.2(c), 11549.5(a) (West 1964) (repealed 1975).
72. A tie vote equalled denial. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
73. This was also accomplished by a tie vote. Id. at 830-31, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
74. Id. at 838, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
75. Id. Query as to the result after Youngblood, notes 16-23 and accompanying
text supra. The council did make a finding of consistency between a community plan
and the zoning plan. The community plan was in existence prior to approval of the
district plan. The district plan was approved one month after the real party in inter-
est filed a tentative tract map, and two-and-a-half weeks before the Council made its
findings of consistency with the community plan.
76. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
77. Id. at 512 n.8, 514, 522 P.2d at 15 n.8, 16, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 839 n.8, 840.
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are necessary to apprise the reviewing court of the basis for
the administrative agency's action and that an agency should
be deterred from using casual decision-making procedures
that may deny some of the parties an opportunity to present
their arguments fully.7" The court stated:
By setting forth a reasonable requirement for findings
and clarifying the standard of judicial review, we believe
we promote the achievement of the intended scheme of
land use control .... Whereas the adoption of zoning
regulations is a legislative function [Gov't Code §65860],
the granting of variances is a quasi-judicial, administra-
tive one .... If the judiciary were to review grants of
variances superficially, administrative boards could sub-
vert this intended decision-making structure.79
In a later consistency case addressing the form of findings
required of a city council, McMillan v. American General Fi-
nance Corp.,80 the court of appeal concluded that substance,
not form, of administrative findings is the proper concern of a
reviewing court. As long as a record informs the parties and
the reviewing court of the agency's theory in reaching its deci-
sion, as long as the agency "in truth found those facts which
as a matter of law were essential to sustain its .. . [deci-
sion]," 81 the opinion said, the form of local government find-
ings will be acceptable. The court graphically described local
government dynamics that demand this conclusion:
Given people's propensity for arriving at identical conclu-
sions for diverse reasons, their inability to foresee all pos-
sible contingencies prior to a meeting, and their unceasing
ability to quibble over the semantics of substantially
identical phrases in spite of time limitations, this proce-
dure would generally seem reasonable.
82
The opinion further concluded that requiring explicit record-
ing of findings that derive from the noise and confusion pre-
ceding development decisions would be unworkable. The pro-
cedure in this case, which the court approved, was that the
city council make findings prior to having the city attorney
78. Id. at 516, 518, 522 P.2d at 18-19, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
79. Id. at 517, 522 P.2d at 19, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
80. 60 Cal. App. 3d 175, 131 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1977).
81. Id. at 184, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (quoting Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 40 Cal. 2d 102, 124, 251 P.2d 955, 967 (1953)).
82. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 183 n.8, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 467 n.8.
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draft a formal resolution and incorporate by reference a staff
report as the body's findings."
The court in McMillan also demonstrated an application
of the substantial evidence test. It cited several pieces of evi-
dence that supported the finding of consistency.84 These in-
cluded official reports and opinions that would clearly stand
up favorably to the opposition's evidence of lack of conformity
with the general plan. The opposition presented information
in a city brochure about proposed use of the landowner's
property and testimony by several people that an inconsis-
tency existed. 5 There was enough good supporting evidence
so that the decision could not be rejected by a reasonable per-
son-the requirement of the substantial evidence test.8
The court in Mountain Defense League,87 considering the
county's approval of the private development plan, came to
the same conclusions about findings as the courts in Wood-
land Hills and McMillan. Essentially, the court decided that
the board of supervisors had failed to "bridge the gap" be-
tween the raw evidence and its decision; the case went back to
the board to make findings. The court noted that while "find-
ings need not be formal and may be included as part of the
agency's order,"88a sufficient information must be presented to
apprise a reviewing court of the basis of the government's ac-
tions. Raw evidence in the record will not suffice.
In another part of the Mountain Defense League opinion,
the court decided that consideration of a private development
plan falls under a board's quasi-judicial role (whereas consid-
eration of a general plan is a legislative function), and thus
83. Id. at 184, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
84. Id. at 186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
85. Id. In Chevy Chase Estate Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 2 Civ. No. 52161 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 17, 1978), the court in an unpublished opinion demonstrated how easily
the substantial evidence test can be met. The court found "striking deviations" be-
tween a proposed subdivision and a local government open space element of a general
plan; however, "[iun a number of respects" the project was compatible with the spe-
cific uses and programs of the open space element. The substantial evidence test thus
required the court to conclude that filling in vegetation corridors where only 40 per-
cent of the project would remain open space did not do violence to the object of the
retention of the area in its natural setting. The court said, in addition, "[Any reason-
able doubt whether the city's findiig of consistency is supported by substantial evi-
dence must be resolved in favor of the finding." Id.
86. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
87. 65 Cal. App. 3d 723, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1977).
88. Id. at 731, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
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any denial or approval is subject to the substantial evidence
test.89 Since the agency was simultaneously making a legisla-
tive decision (amending the general plan) and a quasi-judicial
decision (approving the PDP), the court declared that review
of the combined decision must meet the more stringent sub-
stantial evidence standard rather than the arbitrary and ca-
pricious test that governs purely legislative decisions.90
Findings are not necessary when denying a zoning
change. One kind of land-use decision, aside from promulga-
tion or amendment of a general plan that a California court
decided did not require express findings, is a city's refusal to
rezone a parcel upon the application of a landowner. In En-
sign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council,9' the city of
Livermore had denied an application of a property owner for
commerical zoning in an area formerly zoned commercial but
recently rezoned for residential use only. The commercial des-
ignation was consistent with the city's general plan. The city
denied the- rezoning because its policy was to locate the type
of commercial use that plaintiff contemplated for his property
in an area that was zoned especially for such use. The city
had, in fact, written to the commercial establishment that
planned to use plaintiff's property and urged it to locate in
another part of town. Livermore's stated objective was to pro-
mote phasing of growth in a particular manner.
The trial court decided for the plaintiff, accepting his ar-
gument that the city's motive was invalid-that, in fact the
city was trying to eliminate a competitive threat to the part of
town where the city council favored development." The lower
court found the city's action to be arbitrary and capricious,
rather than a valid exercise of the police power, since a zoning
decision is supposed to be predicated upon consideration of
the general welfare and not on a desire to regulate economic
competition . 3 The court also faulted the city for its failure to
make findings.
On appeal, the court denied that the city's motive had
89. Id. at 729, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
90. Id.
91. 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977).
92. The lower court also found that the city had unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated against Bickford and denied him equal protection of the laws, but this was
reversed on appeal. Id. at 472, 137 Cal. Rptr. 307.
93. Id.
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any relevance to the zoning decision, stating that the "reason-
ableness of its action is to be judged on the objective results of
the decision '" and not on the indirect impact on economic
competition. Moreover, the court of appeal said that a city
council, in enacting or amending a zoning ordinance, is not
required to make express findings of fact as to the public pur-
pose of the ordinance or its relation to the police power, and
that this rule extends to the denial of a rezoning request as
well. The court explicitly rejected a change in California law
that would have adopted the Oregon position that "zoning ac-
tions short of comprehensive revision of the zoning ordinance
are judicial in character. '95 Since the court found there was a
rational basis for the city's decision-that of regulating com-
merical growth as it related to the needs of residential ar-
eas-it held that the city had not acted improperly.
The independent judgment rule. None of the courts re-
viewing consistency cases has found the independent judg-
ment rule applicable. The independent judgment test, which
applies to quasi-judicial agency decisions, is reserved for those
situations where the administrative decision substantially af-
fects a fundamental, vested right acquired by the petitioner.
When this standard is used, the trial court makes its own in-
dependent findings and review on appeal is directed to
whether there is substantial evidence to support the court's
findings. On the other hand, if the substantial evidence test
applies, both the trial and appellate courts are limited in their
review to looking at the agency's findings alone to see if these
are supported by substantial evidence. In Mountain Defense
League, the plaintiffs, who were hikers and who enjoyed the
out-of-doors on the developer's land, tried to argue that they
had a fundamental, vested right to conserve and preserve the
open space that was about to be developed. On this basis, they
argued that an independent judgment of the local government
action should be made by the court because the action af-
fected their open space. They based their argument on Cali-
fornia's promotion of open space through its Constitution and
statutes. The court refused to apply the independent judg-
ment test, finding that the plaintiffs had acquired no rights to
the property.
94. Id. at 478, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
95. Id. at 473, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
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While the independent judgment test has failed to attract
the courts' sympathies thus far, some proponents of the con-
sistency requirement might read the rights created by plan-
ning as "fundamental" or "vested," requiring a reviewing
court to undertake an independent judgment of a governmen-
tal decision which should be guided by a plan. For example, if
the general plan were equated quite literally with a local con-
stitution and a one-to-one relationship between the plan and
regulation were required, the plan might be seen as affecting
rights "of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of...
economics or . . .effect in human terms and the importance
...to the individual in the life situation." Economic values
are commonly affected by planning decisions, and the term
"life situation" as used in California law is readily adaptable
to analysis of uses of private property. When planning is in-
creased in status and legal effect, it is not inconceivable that a
reviewing court would conclude that fundamental interests
are affected by consistency decisions and that strict scrutiny
is required. At the present time, however, the California
courts have viewed their role vis A vis consistency cases as a
limited one.
Remedies
Two California appellate decisions address the issue of
the appropriate remedies where courts find local government
regulations inconsistent with applicable land-use plans. In
both cases the reviewing courts found adequate direction from
the consistency statutes and exhibited no inclination to create
remedies or alter their availability.
The court in Save El Toro Association v. Days9 was able
to find a remedy written into the consistency statutes to take
care of the situation where there is an inconsistency between a
proposed governmental action and an open space plan. The
relevant language provides: "No building permit may be is-
sued, no subdivision map approved, and no open-space zoning
ordinance adopted, unless the proposed construction, subdivi-
sion or ordinance is consistent with the local open space
plan. ' '9e
Once the court found that the actions taken by the city of
96. 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977).
97. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65567 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
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Morgan Hill did not amount to a plan and that compliance
with the state planning law cannot be found if there exists
only a "partial plan,""8 the court's reasoning was simply syllo-
gistic: "As the City . . . has not adopted a valid open space
plan the city cannot take any action to acquire, regulate or
restrict open space land or approve a subdivision map." 99
The same court that heard Save El Toro, and two of the
same three judges, however, could find no strong legislatively
created remedies to apply to the situation in Friends of "B"
Street v. City of Hayward.100 In that case, the city of Hay-
ward planned to widen certain streets in order to improve cir-
culation. The project would create a number of short-term en-
vironmental disruptions, e.g., removal of trees, elimination of
parking, and alteration of the residential character of a sec-
tion of Hayward. Several consistency issues were involved.
The citizens group called "Friends of 'B' Street" sought to en-
join the city from proceeding with the project until the city
developed a noise element for its general plan, made its circu-
lation element consistent with its plans for affected streets,
and modified the project to "conform to the general plan poli-
cies on strip development, and the central business
district."101
The court of appeal agreed with plaintiffs on the consis-
tency count 0 2 that the real issue was one of available reme-
dies under California planning law. In a footnote the court
stated:
[T]he question "does not involve a determination of ap-
pellants' standing to seek relief generally nor does it in-
volve a determination of appellants' standing to seek re-
lief by writ of mandate to compel compliance with the
State Planning and Zoning Act." . . . Rather the issue is
"whether ... an injunction against proceeding with a
98. See the discussion of Save El Toro at text accompanying notes 27-38 supra.
99. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 74, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 288. Just as the court looked to the
state's strong policy favoring open space when it determined what is an "adequate"
plan, the court may have been swayed by that policy in its stringent application of
the statutory remedy.
100. 1 Civ. No. 40086 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1977) (rehearing granted) (unpub-
lished opinion).
101. Id.
102. Id. The suit also involved a CEQA count and a claim for attorney's fees.
California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 2100021176 (West
1977 & Supp. 1979).
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street widening project is relief which is available to apel-
lants in order to remedy violations of the State Planning
and Zoning Act."10
The court's response was that such relief is not available.
Rather, a proper remedy was held to be an action to compel
adoption of a mandated element that was missing from the
city's plan. The court simply could find no indication in Cali-
fornia law that the legislature intended to provide for the in-
junctive remedy, although its opinion does leave open the pos-
sibility that the remedy might be available against a general
law city. Hayward is a charter city, which as noted above, 10 4 is
only subject to the state consistency laws if it adopts them as
its own. The decision seems incompatible with the courts ar-
ticulated adherence to the position that the general plan is a
constitution for further development within a city, and that
without that constitution, a city cannot proceed with
regulation. 10 5
Function and Importance of the Comprehensive Plan
One can discern, in the consistency cases in California,
the judicial attitude toward the role of the comprehensive
plan in local government decision making. The courts have
paid attention to the plan as a guide and at times even as a
constitution for controlling development at the local level.
Overall, however, the opinions have only nodded at the plan
without increasing its action-forcing function.
In Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council,106 the
court placed more emphasis on the planning process than on
the tangible product in California, i.e., the general plan. Up-
holding the local government's refusal to rezone to bring a
zoning into consistency with the plan, the court emphasized
the local government's police powers. The court was content
to let the city base the decision on the "public interest, conve-
103. 1 Civ. No. 40086 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1977) (rehearing granted) (unpub-
lished opinon).
104. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
105. The case awaits further development since it was appealed to the supreme
court and sent back to the court of appeal for reconsideration. A new opinion may be
forthcoming on what remedies to apply to a charter city that proceeds with develop-
ment in the face of an inadequate plan.
106. 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977).
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nience and general welfare"1 ' and not to examine the plan,
thus refusing to deviate from what it read as long-standing
judicial deference to a legislative determination. This kind of
decision diminishes the importance of a general plan. By
framing the issue in terms of the general welfare, the court
explicitly took the decision out of the shadows of the plan.
The court paid attention to the plan only in dicta, recognizing
that only when the council moves to "amend the zoning ordi-
nance [is] conformance with the General Plan" required.
Where the local government wishes to reject a proposed zon-
ing which would bring the area into conformance with the
plan, the consistency requirement is simply not applicable. 10 8
The city's conclusions in Ensign Bickford Realty and the
court's support of them reflect traditional thinking on the
function of the plan. These conclusions would not have sur-
prised anyone in the planning profession prior to the time
A.B. 1301 took effect. Plaintiffs like Bickford should, however,
reasonably be able to rely on the consistency statutes in the
wake of passage of A.B. 1301.109 If one objective of consistency
reform is to improve the predictability of development deci-
sions, opinions like Ensign Bickford Realty do not promote
that goal.
Can planning effect a "taking"? Another aspect of the
impact of the consistency doctrine on planning received atten-
tion in two California court of appeal opinions where the rela-
tionship of the consistency requirement to alleged inverse
condemnation was at issue. 110 Requiring that property use be
brought into line with a plan may at times result in inverse
107. Id. at 473, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
108. Id. Here the only consistency issue argued was a local consistency
requirement.
109. The facts show that the planning commission had concluded that the pop-
ulation base was insufficient to support the use Bickford sought; the commission
found that Bickford's plans would not serve community objectives and that in fact
infrastructure considerations (the lack of sewer capacity) made unlikely the develop-
ment of a supporting population. Id. at 471, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 306. This analysis,
however, is at odds with that upon which plaintiffs like Bickford may have reasonably
relied, i.e., that A.B. 1301 increased the significance of zoning designations in the
general plan. The court's statement of facts reveals that the zoning Bickford required
was "at all times" consistent with the general plan until a few months before Bick-
ford requested a commercial use. Then the zoning was made inconsistent through a
change to a residential designation. Id.
110. Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520
(1976).
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condemnation, but what is the effect of creating a plan that
calls for a less economically productive or valuable use of
someone's property? Have the consistency statutes furthered
a landowner's claims that there has been a taking of his prop-
erty without just compensation?
Government action in planning for a future use of a piece
of property or an area in which a parcel is located has often
been the subject of litigation; such planning has been said to
devalue the property. This action is called "planning blight"
and it is argued that it should give rise to compensation.111
Complainants have sometimes even taken the position that
since the plan approximates regulation in jurisdictions that
follow the consistency doctrine (and strict regulations can be
the basis for inverse condemnation 1 "), damages can accrue
from the time the plan was adopted.
Prior to the passage of the consistency statutes, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court spoke to the question of whether plan-
ning can be the basis for suits in inverse condemnation.I Is
Generally, under California law, an action in inverse condem-
nation will not lie simply if a plan calls for a less valuable use
of property than the landowner's preferred or proposed use." 4
When, however, the government has acted to lessen the value
of a piece of land just prior to actually condemning it, the
California courts have required some compensation." 5
Since the consistency doctrine became law, the court of
appeal addressed inverse condemnation in light of consistency
requirements-showing little change in the courts' position.
The case involved a charter city, so the decision was not con-
trolled by the state consistency statutes. The case is, however,
instructive of more recent thinking about planning blight.
111. Just compensation must be paid for the taking of private property for pub-
lic use under federal and state consitutional provisions. The relevant provision in Cal-
ifornia law is CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. See Hagman, Compensable Regulation: A Way
of Dealing with Wipeouts from Land Use Control, 54 U. OF DET. J. URB. L. 45 (1976).
112. The nature of regulation that can be the basis of a taking is itself a matter
of considerable controversy. In California, under certain circumstances, noncon-
demnation regulatory actions by government can be treated as a condemnation. See
DiMento et. al., supra note 14.
113. See Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d
111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
114. Id.
115. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1972); Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1969); Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
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In Dale v. City of Mountain View,116 the plaintiffs alleged
that an amendment to the city's general plan designed to al-
low only open space use of their land, and the zoning ordi-
nance that had been or might be enacted consistent with the
plan, constituted an uncompensated taking.1 17 The Dales
owned a parcel that had been used for ten years as a golf
course under a conditional use permit. Although the parcel
was located in an interim agricultural zone, this designation
and the contractual relations between the Dales and the city
(which are not described in the opinion) pointed to an even-
tual residential use of the Dales' land. The property in ques-
tion was surrounded by city owned land that was zoned for
multiple family residential use. Thus, the Dales' expectations
of a zone change were not unrealistic. Nonetheless, the city
denied their application for residential zoning and amended
its general plan so that no use other than visual or recrea-
tional open space would be allowed.
The appellate court opinion upheld the city's reasoning
that the amendment to the plan was simply a recognition of
an existing use of the land and denied the Dales relief in in-
verse condemnation. The court, however, recognized that the
value of the plaintiff's land was "diminished to a level of not
more than one-sixth of the value of the land it is contiguous
to.""'  The court also acknowledged that the property was
suited only for eventual residential use by the terms of the
agricultural zoning itself and observed that surrounding par-
cels, including nearby land owned by the city, were allowed a
more intensive use than that demanded of the Dales' land.
Nonetheless, the court relied on Selby Realty Co. v. City of
San Buenaventura,"' one of the leading California cases stat-
ing that planning generally does not effect a taking. The Dale
court quoted the following statement from Selby Realty Co.:
[TI he plan is by its very nature merely tentative and sub-ject to change .... If the plan is implemented by the
county in the future in such manner as actually to affect
116. 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976). See also Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 398 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979) aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W.
4700 (1980) (pre-condemnation activities in relation to a zoning change).
117. Plaintiffs argued that the action constituted a spot zoning as well. Id. at
105, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
118. Id. at 106, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
119. 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
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plaintiff's free use of his property, the validity of the
county's action may be challenged at that time. '
The court relied on Selby Realty Co. at least in part because
of its concern over the implications of accepting the Dales' po-
sition. The court feared that if it were to allow "judicial decla-
ration as to the validity and potential effect of the plan upon
• . . land, the courts of the State would be inundated with
futile litigation.'
' 2 1
In summary, the Dale case adheres to the traditional po-
sition in California. Whether under the consistency doctrine,
planning will in the future be seen as precondemnation blight
(i.e., a taking), remains to be decided.
The consistency requirement and the phasing-in of
plans. Finally, on the function of the local plan, the question
of phasing of uses proposed in the plan is addressed. Young-
blood 2 2 raises the issue of the impact of consistency on the
acceptable timetable according to which uses eventually called
for in the plan will be provided through regulations. Phasing
refersto this timing concern.
In Youngblood, the reviewing court found no abuse of
discretion in local government's approval of a residential use
in an agricultural zone "since [the zone] permitted one acre
residential use, and since the county contemplated subsequent
replacement of that zone with a more suitable residential
zone." 28 It is the second phrase, in the court's reasoning, that
hints at its interpretation of the effect of consistency on phas-
ing of uses. The court continued and noted: "The practical
120. Id. at 118, 514 P.2d at 118, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
121. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 524. Since this was a charter city,
the issue of whether a taking could occur as a result of planning in a general law city
is still alive, although the differences between the two types of municipal government
do not readily indicate on what basis general law cities could be found to effect an
unconstitutional taking by planning when charter cities do not. A charter city is one
which, by a majority vote of its electors, adopts a charter that serves as the law of the
state on municipal affairs and has the effect of state legislative enactments. CAL.
CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 5. General law cities are those which in matters of municipal
government are controlled by state law. Other parts of the Dale opinion indicate that
the court continued to see planning "as leagues away" from condemnation whether
the defendant be a charter or a general law city. The court cited favorable language in
another California decision that "landowners have no vested rights in existing or an-
ticipated zoning ordinances and are not entitled to reimbursement for losses due to
changes in zoning." Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 602,
55 Cal. Rptr. 710, 712 (1967).
122. 22 Cal. 3d 644,'586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
123. Id. at 653, 586 P.2d at 560, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
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realities of the subdivision suggest that it is unlikely that
pending such rezoning any of the lot purchasers would devote
their property to agricultural uses noxious to a residential
subdivision. "124
The court indicated that consistency can be evaluated by
comparing present developmental controls with uses comtem-
plated in the general plan for some future time, suggesting
that it is responding to market realities. But there are alterna-
tive readings of the impact of the consistency doctrine in fos-
tering uses called for at some later date in the general plan.
One interpretation, for example, would have the regulatory
controls allow uses only according to a chronology which the
plan makers direct. The plan, therefore, plays a phasing and
control function. The need for intermediate uses including low
intensity uses might be fostered by the plan; this goal is un-
dermined by an interpretation that since more intensive uses
are inevitable they should be provided for now. Indeed, since
there is a general assumption in planning practice that zoning
for non-intensive use will prevail in the absence of demand for
greater use, the court's view is that any market demand can
trigger a movement toward more intensive use. The land de-
velopment control scheme, then, simply reflects those scena-
rios that the most development oriented desire. There exist
readings on the effect of the consistency doctrine on phasing
that are much more sympathetic to a sequential guiding func-
tion of the general plan.125
Especially if value is put on those intermediate uses that
a general plan calls for-in this case, agricultural use, tolerat-
ing some residences-the court's selection of land use "reali-
ties" is distressing. Contemplated use of much of the land in
California and in many states experiencing great demand for
residential use may be incompatible with state overall needs
even if such use is rationally and slowly phased in. If develop-
ment pressure is able to short circuit movement to regulations
that allow highly intensive uses as soon as some demand is
noted, the controlling effect of plans is quite severely
undercut.
124. Id.
125. See DiMento, Consistency, supra note 4, at 56-58.
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CONCLUSION
The California courts have made a modest contribution
to the consistency doctrine. The doctrine, requiring that gov-
ernment engage in planning and that land use controls, such
as zoning, be based on resulting plans, can be read as a major
reform in land use law. The legal effect of the doctrine, how-
ever, has been greatly restrained by recent judicial interpreta-
tions. The courts have viewed the doctrine as a mild societal
directive to bolster an older, long-standing doctrine that land
use controls must "accord with" a general plan.
The case law reviewed in this article has provided some
answers to a series of questions raised by the legislative pro-
nouncement in California that controls shall be consistent
with a general plan, and, in particular, with specified elements
of a plan. The cases, however, amount to only a limited
change in land use law and a restatement that, on many con-
sistency issues, the courts must defer to the local legislative
bodies.
Specifically, the California Supreme Court has defined
the applicable general plan with which subdivision map ap-
proval must be measured for consistency. California appellate
opinions have also offered some guidance on the adequacy of
plans and on the types of controls which local governments
must analyze for consistency. In addition, the courts have laid
out two options for the definition of "consistency," refusing,
however, to choose either of them. The courts have also re-
fused to expand the function of the judiciary with regard to
municipal decisions; they have not seen fit to employ an inde-
pendent judgment test in reviewing local government consis-
tency determinations. Joining those institutions that are pay-
ing their respects to planning, the courts, nevertheless, have
not utilized opportunities to enhance measurably the status of
planning in California. This posture is in keeping with a sig-
nificant, if not majority, professional position on the function
of plans and planners in the United States. "
Despite the reticence of the California courts in interpret-
ing the consistency legislation, statutory language and plan-
ning history leave open the opportunity for the courts to read
into California law a more forceful role for planning without
126. This position is spelled out in DiMento, Consistency, supra note 4.
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becoming an overly activist judiciary. The courts need to en-
gage in conceptual work to interpret the meaning of the legis-
lature's consistency pronouncements. The alternative is that
those pronouncements will quietly be lost among the massive
number of California code sections. Commentators, the Attor-
ney General, and additional legislation can interpret this new
planning law. However, parts of the elaboration await resolu-
tion and analysis of controversies that arise out of the local
government planning and zoning decisions that are made
every day.
It is not easy to explain this conservative judicial stance
in California, especially since the California Supreme Court
has led the nation in liberal pronouncements on environmen-
tal and development control law in the past. Perhaps the pre-
sent wave of social and political concern with the economic
effect; of government action is influencing the judici-
ary-decreasing its interest in enhancing the prestige of land-
use planning, which citizens perceive to be a non-market re-
sponse to resource management.1 27
Litigation, however, does not necessarily guarantee clarifi-
cation of the consistency doctrine. The judiciary must first be
educated about the planning debate over the wisdom of tying
zoning and other land-use controls to planning. Moreover, the
judiciary operates in an environment where .images of plan-
ning as an overly rigid tool for social engineering and control
still linger. In addition, a judicial attitude of protection of in-
dividual property rights may cause judges to be skeptical
about, stronger planning requirements. Finally, the courts may
continue to defer to local government determinations because
of either a traditional understanding that local land-use regu-
lation is a legislative function and presumptively valid or a
reflection of the fact that land management decisions have not
yet-despite the costs and inconveniences of uncontrolled
growth-become of fundamental importance to society.
127. Official concern over economic impacts of regulation has been manifested
nationally and in California. The federal government recently created a Regulatory
Analysis and Research Group (RARG), that analyzes and comments on the inflation-
ary implications of regulations proposed and promulgated by federal agencies. A simi-
lar group has been suggested for the cabinet level in California, and individual regula-
tory agencies have initiated their own regulatory reviews in an attempt to reduce
alleged constraints on productivity and innovation associated with command and
control approaches to resource management and use..
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